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The Property Rights Path 
to Sustainable Development
Terry L. Anderson and Laura E. Huggins
You can’t have a free society without private property.
—Milton Friedman
ustainable development has become the byword of environmental policy.
The term has been around for about thirty years but has only recently
become popular (see International Institute for Sustainable Development
2002). The basic notion is that current consumption of natural resources, includ-
ing air and water for waste disposal, is reducing the stock or quality of those
resources so that future generations will have less. If it is true that there are
finite resource stocks, consumption today will preclude sustained consumption
in the future.
In this sense, sustainable development dates back to the eighteenth-cen-
tury writings of Reverend Thomas Malthus, who believed that the decline of liv-
ing conditions in nineteenth-century England was due to the inability of
resources to keep up with the rising human population, and more recently to
the “limits to growth” theory promoted by the Club of Rome in the 1970s. Armed
with giant computers, this group predicted precise years when we would reach
our limits. Their predictions of disaster for humankind called for regulations
restricting natural-resource-depleting economic and technological progress. 
This gloom and doom theory has been resurrected under the guise of sus-
tainable development, calling for changes in virtually every aspect of our con-
sumption and production. Starting in the late 1980s, environmentalists and gov-
ernment officials began using the term “sustainable development” when
discussing environmental policy. For example, the seminal United Nations
Bruntland Report (Bruntland 1987, 9) claimed that “sustainable development
can only be pursued if population size and growth are in harmony with the
changing productive potential of the ecosystem.” A paper by the U.S. Depart-
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ment of Housing and Urban Development (1995, 2) declared that “humanity’s
collective imperative now is to shift modern society rapidly onto a sustainable
path or have it dissolve of its own ecologically unsustainable doings.”
More recently the interpretations of the term have been broadened to
include issues such as poverty, health care, and education. The Johannesburg
Declaration on Sustainable Development (2002, 2) stated that “poverty eradication,
changing consumption and production patterns, and protecting and managing
the natural resource base for economic and social development are overarching
objectives of, and essential requirements for, sustainable development.”
The term sounds beguilingly simple, but it is vague and operationally vac-
uous. Sustainable development is most often defined as resource use that meets
“the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations
to meet their own needs”—a definition first offered by the United Nations’
Bruntland Commission. Of course, nobody wants to make future generations
poorer and less healthy, but this definition provides no guidance for how this
result can be avoided. There is no way to know what resource use is accept-
able today and no way to know what future generations may desire (see Hay-
ward 2002). Yet because of its deceptive simplicity, sustainability is applied to
anything from agricultural practices to energy use to mining. As environmental
scientist Timothy O’Riordan stated, “It may only be a matter of time before the
metaphor of sustainability becomes so confused as to be meaningless, certainly
as a device to straddle the ideological conflicts that pervade contemporary envi-
ronmentalism” (O’Riordan 1988, 29).
Implicit in the calls for sustainable development are two fundamental
assumptions. The first is that we are running out of resources, thus leaving
future generations with less; the second is that market processes are the cause
of these depletions. We challenge both of these assumptions and argue that eco-
nomic systems based on property rights and the rule of law are the best hope
for humanity today to leave an endowment for humanity tomorrow.
For those familiar with the writings of Milton and Rose Friedman, there is
nothing new in this conclusion. In Free to Choose, the Friedmans forcefully
argued that political and economic freedom are inseparable and that free-market
forces work better than government controls for achieving real equality, security,
and prosperity. 
In this paper, we build on the Friedmans’ case to argue that sustainable
development, if it can be defined, is only possible in a legal system where prop-
erty rights are well defined, enforced, and transferable. Property rights provide
the structure that encourages development, innovation, conservation, and dis-
covery of new resources. Growth and increasing wealth through these mecha-
nisms lead to environmental quality by raising the demand for it and by pro-
viding the wherewithal to meet these demands. In this context, economic
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Therefore, how we deal with the evolution and protection of property rights
and the rule of law in the future will not only determine how free and pros-
perous we are, but also how much environmental quality we enjoy.
THE PROVEN PATH TO SUSTAINABILITY
If sustainable development can be defined as a call to maximize human
welfare over time, then Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations could be called “the
world’s first blueprint for sustainable development” (Taylor 2002, 29). According
to Smith’s blueprint for sustainable development, the wealth of nations depended
on market processes guided by the invisible hand, which we now understand
was not so invisible. Perhaps no one since Adam Smith has so eloquently made
it clear that the invisible hand is really property rights and the rule of law as have
Milton and Rose Friedman. Institutions such as property rights and the rule of
law provide the framework within which people act and interact. They are the
rules, customs, norms, and laws that remove the responsibility to calculate the
effect of our actions on the rest of humanity and replace it with a responsibility
to abide by simple rules that benefit society as a whole. In the words of Richard
Epstein, “The government works best when it establishes the rules of the road,
not when it seeks to determine the composition of the traffic” (Epstein 1995, xiii).
Sustainable institutions are those that do not prescribe an outcome for
society, but allow individuals to improve their own well-being. Truly sustainable
institutions provide the freedom for people to improve their world by innovat-
ing and developing. The best way to ensure that resources remain for future
generations is to directly tie the well-being of people today to those resources—
via decentralization and property rights. If individuals have the responsibility of
caring for their welfare today, they are more likely to make decisions that will
benefit their children, and their children’s children (see Taylor 2003).
Modern data support the conclusion that Adam Smith’s blueprint works.
The Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World: 2003 Annual Report rates
and ranks 123 nations based on thirty-eight variables to conclude that the more
economically free a country, the greater the level of human development
enjoyed by its citizens (Gwartney, Lawson, and Emerick 2003). Figure 1 helps
illustrate the basic notion that economic freedom contributes to a faster grow-
ing and more efficient economy, which translates into better and longer lives.
“Freeing people economically unleashes individual drive and initiative and puts
a nation on the road to economic growth,” says Milton Friedman, one of the
original creators of the economic freedom index. “In turn, economic growth and
independence from government restrictions promote civil and political liberty”
(quoted in Gwartney, Lawson, and Emerick 2003).
These findings are supported by other scholars. Seth Norton, for example,
has calculated the statistical relationship between various freedom indexes and60 Terry L. Anderson and Laura E. Huggins
environmental improvements. His results show that institutions—especially
property rights and the rule of law—are key to human well-being and environ-
mental quality. Norton examined the role of economic institutions on human
well-being by dividing a sampling of countries into groups with low, medium,
and high economic freedom and the same categories for the rule of law. Table 1
contains the measures of human well-being for the various groups of countries.
In all cases except water pollution, those in countries with low economic free-
dom are worse off than those in countries with moderate economic freedom,
while in all cases those in countries with high economic freedom are better off
than those in countries with medium economic freedom. A similar pattern is evi-
dent for the rule of law measures (see Norton 2003). 
Theodore Panayotou (1997, 465–84) tested five indicators of general insti-
tutional quality: “respect/enforcement of contracts, efficiency of the bureau-
cracy, efficacy of the rule of law, extent of government corruption, and the risk
of appropriation.” He found that higher indexes for the institutional variable led
to significant environmental quality improvements. In another study, Madhusu-
dan Bhattarai (2000) found that civil and political liberties, the rule of law, the
quality and corruption levels of government, and the security of property rights
were important in explaining deforestation rates in sixty-six countries across
Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Without question, institutions—especially prop-
Figure 1
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erty rights and the rule of law—are key to environmental improvements (see
Anderson 2003).
Policies for sustainable development that prescribe forgoing economic
growth in the name of preserving future resources could stall or reverse a
proven path of progress. The temptation to impose new layers of government
regulation in order to prevent humans from depleting resources for future gen-
erations must be pushed aside. Consider the use of whale oil for energy in the
nineteenth century. The whale population was unsustainable due to heavy
hunting pressures. The near depletion of whales may have threatened the bio-
logical diversity of the planet, but the loss of whale oil as a resource did not
hamper future generations from meeting their needs. More plausibly, according
to Steven Hayward (2002, 4), “the use of whale oil facilitated economic devel-
opment—growing wealth, incomes, occupational specialization, and techno-
logical prowess—that put humankind in a position to adopt better, more effi-
cient, more sustainable methods of production.” The demand for whale oil
contributed to the development of petroleum and electricity, which were more
efficient than whale oil and hence helped restore the whale population.
GROWTH UNBOUND
A popular interpretation of sustainable development presumes that envi-
ronmental degradation is predominantly caused by, and therefore is the respon-
sibility of, rich countries. People in the wealthy world consume a large propor-
Table 1
Economic Institutions and Human Well-Being
Economic Freedom Rule of Law
Measure of Well-Being Low Medium High Weak Medium Strong
Poverty index 38.1 30.5 14.5 31.8 33.0 16.4
Death by 40 29.1 19.4 7.7 19.6 21.7 10.8
Adult illiteracy 39.2 34.7 12.5 32.1 37.8 17.0
Safe water 43.3 34.7 19.5 34.8 36.2 20.1
Health service 40.5 28.5 16.8 41.3 28.0 15.2
Undernourished children 29.1 21.7 13.9 25.0 23.1 14.0
Deforestation rates .4 1.4 –.2 1.3 .7 .3
Water pollution .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2
Net savings rates 4.0 7.1 14.8 2.6 6.3 16.0
Agricultural productivity 620.3 1,011.2 6,001.6 1,178.2 1,083.6 4,552.7
SOURCES: Gwartney and Lawson (2001); Political Risk Services (1997); United Nations Development
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tion of the world’s resources and emit too great a proportion of the world’s pol-
lution. Proponents often cling to the beliefs of Dr. Charles Birch (1976, 66), a
member of the Club of Rome, who claimed that “the rich must live more sim-
ply that the poor may simply live.”
Bjørn Lomborg, author of The Skeptical Environmentalist, set out to prove
that resources are becoming more scarce and the environment is getting worse,
but instead concluded that almost all environmental indicators are improving,
primarily because we are wealthier, can afford cleaner technologies, and have
more time and money to devote to environmental luxuries. According to Lom-
borg (2001, 351), “children born today—in both the industrialized world and
developing countries—will live longer and be healthier, they will get more
food, a better education, a higher standard of living, more leisure time and far
more possibilities—without the global environment being destroyed.” Further-
more, Lomborg finds positive correlations between economic growth and envi-
ronmental quality. He correlates the World Bank’s environmental sustainability
index with per capita gross domestic product across 117 nations, concluding
that “higher income in general is correlated with higher environmental sustain-
ability” (Lomborg 2001, 32).
Similar results came from a recent Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI)
developed by the joint effort of the World Economic Forum, the Yale University
Center for Environmental Law and Policy, and the Columbia University Center
for International Earth Science Information Network. The group measured 142
nations based on twenty indicators and sixty-eight related variables in order to
place a sustainability score on each nation. On the ESI scale for 2002, Finland
came in first, with a score of 73.9, and Kuwait came in last, with a score of 23.9. 
The most significant finding derived from the ESI study compares each
nation’s ESI score with its gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and shows
that a strong relationship exists between wealth and environmental quality, as
seen in Figure 2. Careful analysis of the figure reveals a depiction of what econ-
omists call the environmental Kuznets curve, based after Nobel laureate Simon
Kuznets. At lower levels of income, environmental quality can deteriorate as
people trade off environmental quality for economic growth, but as income 
levels rise, the demand for environmental quality increases at a higher rate (see
Yandle, Vijayaraghavan, and Bhattarai 2002).
The work of Indur Goklany adds further optimism to the potential for eco-
nomic growth to be a major factor in improving environmental quality. In case
after case, Goklany demonstrates that economic growth allows the developing
world to enjoy higher living standards sooner than the developing world did in
the past. For example, once a country such as the United States creates filters
for water purification, developing countries do not have to “reinvent the wheel.”
They can simply acquire the new technology and improve water quality at
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Improvement of the environment with income growth is not automatic but
depends on policies and institutions. Economic growth creates the conditions
for environmental improvement by raising the demand for improved environ-
mental quality and makes the resources available for supplying it. Whether en-
vironmental quality improvements materialize or not, when and how depend
critically on government policies, social institutions, and the completeness and
functioning of markets.
Institutions that promote democratic governments are a prerequisite for
sustainable development and enhanced environmental quality. Where democ-
racy dwells, constituencies for environmental protection can afford to exist—
without people fearing arrest or prosecution. The democratization of thirty-plus
countries in the last twenty-five years has dramatically improved the prospects
for environmental protection (Desta 1999). 
In the other direction, dictatorships and warlords burden people and envi-
ronments in many regions of the world such as China and much of Africa. Zim-
babwean president Robert Mugabe, for example, has clearly indicated that he has
no intention of respecting property rights or the rule of law. His “terror teens”
have brutally killed innocent people, and his “land reform” plan demands that
more than 20 million of the 23.5 million acres under private ownership be sur-
Figure 2
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rendered without compensation. Mugabe’s assault on private property has also
taken a toll on wildlife, for without landowners, there is no one to protect them
from poachers. Before Mugabe’s attack on private property, Zimbabwe had pre-
viously shown the world how to balance economic development with conserva-
tion through private and communal ownership. The CAMPFIRE program, for
example, championed by the World Wide Fund for Nature, allowed local com-
munities to manage wildlife. Hence, wildlife became an asset as villagers in com-
munal areas profited from hunting and photo safaris. Elephant populations
mushroomed and poaching plummeted. But Mugabe has duped the people of
Zimbabwe into thinking that land redistribution without compensation or due
process is the key to economic prosperity. In fact, sustainable development will
come only from stable property rights. Unless the sanctity of private property can
be reestablished in Zimbabwe, its people and its wildlife will continue to suffer.
Environmental degradation does not stem from the actions of the first world
but rather from jumbled bureaucratic systems—often the result of well-meaning
but misguided intervention. In particular, lack of well-defined and adequately
enforceable property rights restricts economic development and stifles entrepre-
neurial activity in many countries. The Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto “esti-
mates that people in the third world and in ex-communist countries hold more
than $9 trillion in what he calls ‘dead capital’—property that is owned informally,
but not legally, and is thus incapable of forming the basis of robust economic de-
velopment. He advocates the formal recognition of property rights in these coun-
tries as an indispensable prerequisite for liberal democracy” (Ponnuru 2003). 
UNSUSTAINABLE REGULATIONS
The focus on center stage should be on promoting institutions that
empower people both politically and economically. These institutions allow
people to improve environmental quality indefinitely into the future. This stands
in sharp contrast to the undying conclusion of the doomsayers for whom the
environment and the plight of human beings will always be worse. Doomsay-
ers continue to profess, as they have since Thomas Malthus, that exponential
economic growth and consumption will ultimately run up against resource lim-
its. Paul and Ann Ehrlich (1996, 11) are perhaps the gloomiest:
Humanity is now facing a sort of slow-motion environmental Dunkirk. It
remains to be seen whether civilization can avoid the perilous trap it has set
for itself. Unlike the troops crowding the beach at Dunkirk, civilization’s fate
is in its own hands; no miraculous last-minute rescue is in the cards.… Even
if humanity manages to extricate itself, it is likely that environmental events
will be defining ones for our grandchildren’s generation—and those events
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Those with this mind-set often call for more government regulation to stop
growth and curb consumption. For example, Klaus Töpfer (2002, 1), executive
director of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), hopes to create a
“model for international environmental governance.”
Implicit in the definition and use of the term sustainable development is
the acceptance that market systems fail to promote sustainability and therefore
that command-and-control regulations are necessary to achieve the goal of sus-
tainable development. Agenda 21, for instance, adopted at the 1992 Earth Sum-
mit in Rio de Janeiro, calls on governments to “create national strategies, plans,
and policies” for sustainable development. 
The solution offered by those who follow this interpretation is to impose
top-down measures such as restrictions on the use of resources, interventions
in the behavior of multinational companies, and restrictions on international
trade. Yet evidence suggests the contrary. 
In 1995, UNEP proposed to restrict and possibly ban twelve chemicals
(persistent organic pollutants, or POPs), including DDT, considered to be damag-
ing to human health and the environment. More recently, the Stockholm Con-
vention (also known as the POPs Treaty) was driven by a network of NGOs and
governments that called these chemicals “the dirty dozen.” Because rich coun-
tries neither produce nor use any of the twelve, they would not feel the effects
of such a ban. The problem is that banning chemicals or technologies, regard-
less of the risks they impose, does not take into account the risk of not having
the technology. People in developing countries are subjected to dirty drinking
water and poor sanitation, and they must cope with farming techniques that
have not advanced since medieval times. 
Man-made chemicals and new technologies can mean the difference
between life and death for many people. Some countries such as Belize, Mozam-
bique, and Bolivia have stopped using DDT in their malaria control programs
because they fear losing the support of wealthy nations through aid. As a con-
sequence, they have suffered a loss of human life. Several scientists have sug-
gested that the insistence by wealthy nations to ban DDT in malaria-infected
countries is a form of eco-colonialism, which may impoverish nations in the
same way that imperial colonialism did in the past (Meiners and Morriss 2001).
“If we are really concerned with ensuring a cleaner environment and with healthier
populations,” writes Richard Tren (2002), “we should concentrate on ensuring
that the developing world can become wealthy. This can be achieved with open
markets and liberalized trade, protection of private property and the rule of law.”
If alarmists’ calls are successful, we will have neither sustainable growth
nor sustainable improvements in environmental quality. When given responsi-
bility for their lives and property, individuals have generally tended to improve
themselves and thus the state of the planet. As Milton and Rose Friedman (1980,
218) explain in Free to Choose, “If we look not at rhetoric but at reality, the air66 Terry L. Anderson and Laura E. Huggins
is in general far cleaner and the water safer today than one hundred years ago.
The air is much cleaner and the water safer in the advanced countries of the
world today than in the backward countries.”
SUSTAINING PROPERTY RIGHTS
It is not resources that are too scarce, but rather the institutions that ensure
freedom—political and economic systems based on secure property rights and
the rule of law. Jerry Taylor (1993, 10) writes: 
The size of our resource pie is determined not by nature but by the social
and economic institutions that set the boundaries of technological advance.
Closed societies and economies under the heavy hand of central economic
planners are doomed to live within the confines of dwindling resource bases
and eventually experience the very collapse feared by the conservationists.
Liberal societies, built on free markets and open inquiry, create resources
and expand the possibilities of mankind.
When the Eastern Bloc countries were freed from communism, Milton
Friedman called for free markets, saying, “Privatize, privatize, privatize.” After
more than a decade of experiments trying to create markets, however, he has
modified his position, asking: “What does it mean to privatize if you do not have
security of property, if you can’t use property as you want to?” (Friedman 2002,
xvii). Russia, for example, was able to create a democracy but no rule of law to
protect private property. Corruption is prevalent, and Russia’s economy has
imploded. This does not trivialize its democratization efforts, but rather empha-
sizes that without the rule of law and protection of property, democracy by itself
cannot bring automatic prosperity.
The institution of private property has had more influence than any other
policy in the history of the world when it comes to enabling people to escape from
poverty. As Tom Bethell (1998, 11) puts it in his book The Noblest Triumph: Property
and Prosperity Through the Ages, “Prosperity and property are intimately con-
nected. Exchange is the basic market activity, and when goods are not individu-
ally owned, they cannot easily be exchanged.” Because of poorly defined institu-
tions and often corrupt bureaucratic systems, a large proportion of the world’s
population is prevented from fully realizing the value of existing property or being
able to acquire secure property rights. Hernando de Soto (2000) explained in his
book, The Mystery of Capital, that the primary problem is that property claims in
developing countries, while acknowledged within their communities, often go
unrecognized by the government. As a result, these informal owners lack access
to the social and economic benefits provided by secure property rights.
When well-defined and enforced property rights are absent, a “tragedy of
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overgraze pastures that are open to all grazers (Hardin 1968). Each potential
grazer has an incentive to fatten his livestock on the grass before someone else
does. Open access to resources lacks two critical components that property
rights systems share—exclusion and governance. Without these two compo-
nents, people have little incentive to economize on the use of resources. The
solution to that problem is to devolve control of resource management to indi-
viduals and local bodies, and to ensure that legal institutions support this (see
Anderson and Huggins 2003). 
A study in Kenya compared the rights and incentives of user groups for
forest resource management in the Mt. Elgon National Park with those of users
in the Mt. Elgon Forest Reserve. The authors find that in the forest reserve,
which represents decentralized management, local community involvement in
decisionmaking and in rule crafting and enforcement resulted in positive incen-
tives for forest conservation. Forest conditions in the forest reserve were found
to be better than in the national park. “The national park’s policy of forbidding
local consumptive use of resources and excluding local populations from mak-
ing resource-related decisions, engendered animosity and considerable conflicts
with the local populations. This created disincentives to local communities that
are reflected in the condition of the forest. Decentralized decisionmaking, in this
case, appears to be associated with better forest conservation outcomes”
(Mwangi, Ongugo, and Njuguna 2000, 1).
Property rights create the incentive for people to invest in assets and give
people possessions against which to borrow so that they might become entre-
preneurs. Failure of a country’s legal system to protect property rights will
undermine the operation of a market exchange system. If individuals and busi-
nesses lack confidence that contracts will be enforced and the fruits of their
labor protected, the drive to engage in productive activity declines along with
the motivation to protect the environment. “Property rights makes the market
possible,” said Hernando de Soto, commenting on the establishment of prop-
erty rights in post-totalitarian Iraq. “Once it’s established, the world of credit
comes along. It makes investment possible. Because when people invest, they
are giving money for a property right. I imagine that the Iraqis are in the same
situation of Egypt. Investment is not possible and credit is not possible.… So no
property rights, no modern Iraq” (Ponnuru 2003).
Furthermore, people need access to economic opportunities. Access to
capital and credit, for example, provided under conditions that promote eco-
nomic opportunities creates an avenue for true development. Private savings
and loans and government loan programs for farmers and students in the United
States presented economic opportunities for low-income and working people.
In South Asia, the Grameen banks have made capital available to poor people.
By creating long-term, low-interest loans, the banks helped generate the wealth
people needed to stimulate economic growth (Desta 1999).68 Terry L. Anderson and Laura E. Huggins
Moreover, the institution of private property offers people an incentive to
develop new technologies because individuals know they will benefit from
investments they make in research and development. Tremendous energy and
resources are being applied today to the development of practical substitutes for
fossil fuels because the motivation exists to discover lower cost substitutes. For
example, brokers are offering cash to farmers who are willing to plant a crop
of wind turbines, and farmers are discovering that investing in wind power can
be more profitable than raising traditional crops. Large companies are eager to
harness the wind. Shell Oil, for example, recently bought its first wind farm in
Wyoming. Landowners are also eager to collect wind royalties—especially
those who can continue to farm with turbines on their property. As Pat Wood,
President Bush’s appointee to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
observed, “We’ve got lots of wind and it’s about time that people figured out a
way to make some money off it” (Huggins 2001, 45).
Economist Julian Simon continually drove home the point that human
ingenuity is perpetually responding to impending scarcity by developing alter-
native technologies that mitigate against that scarcity. The key to mitigating nat-
ural resource constraints is to switch on human ingenuity, which allows us to
accomplish more with a given amount of resources. The fall of the Berlin Wall
and communism has made it clear that turning on this ingenuity requires get-
ting the incentives right through the appropriate institutions. With property
rights and the rule of law in place, economic growth and environmental
improvements will follow (see Anderson 2003).
CONCLUSION
Institutional reform is not free, and many countries, for various reasons,
resist reform that would improve problems related to human well-being. Per-
haps the growing evidence that the protection of private property and growth-
enhancing institutions are the building blocks of human well-being will per-
suade policymakers to reform their established systems (see Norton 2003). Only
by upholding political and economic institutions that promote and protect prop-
erty rights will we be able to sustain development and environmental quality.
As the Friedmans put it:
Our society is what we make it. We can shape our institutions. Physical and
human characteristics limit the alternatives available to us. But none prevents
us, if we will, from building a society that relies primarily on voluntary coop-
eration to organize both economic and other activity, a society that preserves
and expands human freedom, that keeps government in its place, keeping
it our servant and not letting it become our master. (Friedman and Friedman,
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It is critical that we focus our efforts on developing and protecting the
institutions of freedom rather than on regulating human use of natural resources
through political processes. The environment is getting better, not worse, and it
will continue on this course if human ingenuity can continue to hammer out the
institutions of freedom, namely property rights and the rule of law—institutions
that will provide the incentive for us to solve whatever environmental problems
might come our way.
As we head into the next millennium, it becomes increasingly clear that
the progress we have enjoyed is primarily attributable to the freedom of the
marketplace, and Milton and Rose Friedman have done much to ensure that we
have come far on this path. It is important to continue their work by ensuring
that the property rights path to sustainable development is made more visible
in order to protect the institutions of freedom and the environment at the same
time—only then can we have our environmental cake and eat it too!
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